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Accountability, Asylum, and Sanctuary:
Challenging our Political and Legal
Imagination
RICHARD FALK*

I.

THE McDOUGAL PRESENCE

Professor Ved Nanda and others here at the University of Denver
College of Law deserve our gratitude for establishing an annual lecture
bearing the name of this country's most distinguished international lawyer, ever. It is especially impressive that we are moved to acknowledge
Professor McDougal's distinction while he is still very much with us as a
live, active force. Myres McDougal is a teacher and scholar of extraordinary range and power who has inspired by now several generations of
students of the most diverse national, cultural, and ideological background. All over the world one finds influential individuals who can pass
the McDougal loyalty test by reciting the 8 base values in their proper
order no matter what their state of sobriety. Many of us who have been
strongly influenced by the depth and character of McDougal's overall approach often disagree with the foreign policy implications drawn by the
master himself, or by some of his more conservative disciples. No matter.
Far stronger than these disagreements are certain shared features of the
McDougal orientation: above all, a commitment to the creative role of law
and lawyers in carrying out their professional roles in such a way as to
promote the values at stake, an attachment to law as a process that works
toward a humane society for all of its members; and a realization that the
final normative test of adequacy for any legal system is the ways in which
it deals with issues of justice and freedom, especially as pertaining to the
status and rights of individuals.
I am confident that Professor McDougal would be enthusiastic about
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a conference theme devoted to issues associated with the flow of refugees
across international borders. McDougal has always encouraged legal analysis at the cutting edge of societal process, in settings of fundamental
choice, where clashes of interests and policies are at stake.
II.

POSING THE PROBLEM

In general, increases in refugee flows express rising tides of distress in
countries of origin. Individuals seldom cut their roots unless escaping
from something - poverty, repression, the absence of opportunity. Of
course, the pattern is not invariable. Individuals, even segments of a
whole society, are sometimes lured by the image of a promised land elsewhere, and leave the country of birth to fulfill dreams and ambitions, and
possibly merely a quest for adventure and change. But we think of such
persons as immigrants, not refugees; that is, as individuals who have acted out of a discretionary spirit rather than in response to some sort of
felt necessity.
There is one category of refugee that brings joy to the hearts of many
- the deposed dictator who flees from his country of origin to escape
prosecution, imprisonment, and possibly, execution. It is the one kind of
refugee for which, in general, an increase in volume can be taken as a sign
of ameliorating world conditions, a reflection of democratizing tendencies.
There are two important types of states in the world these days that
have opposed preoccupations with walls - those that build walls to keep
people within (Berlin Wall); those that build walls to keep people out
(the chainlink fences and patrolled areas of U.S./Mexico border). Neither
kind of wall is pleasant, although the conditions of daily existence tend to
be more attractive for those who are walling others out because they want
to enjoy the benefits of getting in. Often the experience of the homeland
is vividly dismal, but the image of the promised land is romanticized and
apocryphal. The film El Norte explores this reality, contrasting the magical lure of the United States (the land of the North) for poor, persecuted
Guatemalans with the humiliating and disillusioning rite of passage undergone by an Indian brother and sister who act on this imagery of emancipation and go North, bypassing the wall intended to keep them out, but
then finding a far more disquieting reality on the other side than they
had anticipated.
Nevertheless, the admission of illegitimacy that accompanies a wall
to keep people in is a far more humiliating expression of political impotence on the part of reigning authorities, as it involves holding captive
one's own citizenry. Both kinds of walls are constructed to coincide with
the outer limits of territorial sovereignty and are complementary expressions of unhappiness and despair in the world. Ultimately, overcoming
the challenge of refugees is to work toward a world order system where
neither kind of wall is needed, where freedom of movement is assured,
and no one is either denied entry or held captive. Obviously, such a goal
is remote in a world of gross inequality and unevenness with respect to
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human rights and the material conditions of life. So long as sovereignty
combines with inequality, the issue of refugees is bound to arise, especially under conditions of crowding relative to resources. That is, the invisible influence of population pressures is one important background factor that leads individuals to move from one society to another.
I would like this evening to focus on an aspect of this problem that
arises when United States official policy admits one kind of dubious alien
seeking asylum and expels another kind who has not satisfied our government that refugee status or asylum are warranted. The deposed dictator
is a kind of dubious alien who comes here after plundering his homeland
and is fleeing for safety, often accompanied by a retinue of followers and
a pile of wealth. An ill-considered receptivity to such victims of history
generated the inflamed atmosphere that produced the Iranian Hostage
Crisis in 1979-81 and is again presented in a more ambiguous form by the
1986 arrival and actions of the Marcos family in the state of Hawaii.
The other cluster of issues arises when individuals manage to reach
our country to gain safety, especially these days from the war zones of
Central America, particularly El Salvador, and then by the operation of
government procedures these individuals are ordered to be returned to
their country of origin. In this setting, individuals and communities have
been intervening to provide refuge by reestablishing the ancient religious
practice and tradition of "sanctuary." When Churches and their congregations confer "sanctuary" they are interposing their bodies and lives between the government and these beleaguered individuals from overseas.
The government has reacted by charging criminal interference with the
implementation of "the law," by claiming, in effect, that only the state is
entitled to determine who is entitled to qualify as a legitimate refugee.
III.

EXPLORING THE

ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

AND

AsYLuM

The struggle for human rights and political democracy has over centuries centered upon the struggle by social movements to impose limits
on the exercise and abuse of power by rulers. The most dramatic step
occurred in 1215 when the English nobility, joined by some farming elements, moved England to the brink of civil war in its effort to place limits
on King John's ability through royal prerogative to tax and commit the
country to war -- this was a dramatic step in the direction of establishing
constitutional order, formalized in the Magna Carta. In retrospect, the
overall process of limiting the state has not been fully successful, although the principle of hereditary dynasty has been widely challenged.
After World War II another important innovation was introduced:
the defeated leaders of Germany and Japan were prosecuted and held
responsible for crimes of state committed in their official capacity. Sovereignty was no longer a shield behind which an individual, whether Head
of State or policy-maker, could hide and obtain immunity. One category
of crime prosecuted was Crimes against Humanity, an innovation, that
was restricted to patterns of behavior somehow connected with illegal
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warmaking, but which could theoretically be extended to include abuse of
one's own citizenry in times of peace. Those carrying out these prosecutions claimed at the time that they were creating precedents for the future that would govern the victors as much as those judged in defeat.
These promises were reinforced by the unanimous adoption by the
United Nations General Assembly of the Nuremberg Principles as constituting an authoritative expression of legal obligation.
As often is the case with revolutionary legal principles, the seeds of
Nuremberg have sprouted in expected ways. The main seed has not taken
root as anticipated - the states that dominate international society have
engaged in activity that would appear to constitute crimes of state in the
Nuremberg sense, and have refused even to consider establishing procedures of accountability to judge allegations against their civilian and military leaders. The state has shut tight the Nuremberg door, and does not
even invoke notions of criminal accountability against its most bitter adversaries, or even risk such a taunt for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, the notion that international law binds governments and their leaders has struck a responsive chord in the moral sensibility of modern
society, and a variety of efforts have been made to fill the institutional
vacuum created by the withdrawal of governments from the scene.
During the Vietnam War, the famous British philosopher, Bertrand
Russell, established "a tribunal of distinguished citizens" to inquire into
the legal, moral, and political status of the American involvement in Vietnam (late 1960s). In the last ten years or so, inspired by this model, the
Permanent Peoples Tribunal (PPT) has been established with its headquarters in Rome, and operating within a constitutional framework set
forth in the 1976 Algiers Declaration on the Rights of Peoples.
The PPT was brought into being by an Italian parliamentarian
named Lelio Basso, claiming its authority through spontaneous creation
by citizens and jurists from various countries, through the quality of its
proceedings and publications, and by its willingness to stand apart from
partisan East-West geopolitics. The PPT, quite significantly, investigated
and denounced both the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
United States intervention in Central America. Beyond this the PPT considered a number of grievances against governments, policies, and specific
individuals. It assessed, for instance, Indonesia's conduct in East Timor,
Armenian allegations of Turkish genocide in 1915-16, and Marcos' repressive rule in the Philippines. The proceeding was held in a third country.
The accused government was invited to participate but never has, the
defenses available to the accused government were put before the Tribunal, but perhaps not in a completely satisfactory manner. The Judgment
of the Tribunal is not the outcome of a criminal proceeding against individuals, but is rather, in effect, a validation of a prospective criminal indictment, based on evidence of governmental wrongdoing.
We are now in the midst of two further dramas - the insistence by
the new leadership in Haiti and the Philippines that Duvalier and Marcos
face up to their crimes of state - and in Marcos' case that the property
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plundered be returned. With apparent reluctance, France has accepted
Duvalier, U.S. has accepted Marcos, (although it has sought a more serene place of asylum for the former Filipino leader, but without either
any show of willingness by Marcos or receptivity by foreign governments.)
We extradite lesser criminals, but offer the prospect of a lavish life
style to deposed dictators. Marcos, in a monumental display of imprudence, held a party for 1000 guests in Hawaii shortly after his U.S. arrival, inviting a reaction of fury by those victimized by his 15 years of plundering rule, but unlike the Khomeini government in Iran, the Aquino
leadership has not played upon Marcos' criminal culpability during his
period of Filipino rule.
In the case of Marcos and the Shah, the U.S. Government shielded
rulers whom it has earlier supported, and even helped to remain in power.
In the case of Iran, the CIA facilitated the disruption of the constitutional process by facilitating Mossadegh's overthrow in 1953; to many
Iranians, even those outside the religious movement, the decision to admit the Shah was interpreted as a refusal by Washington to accept the
outcome of the Iranian revolution. This interpretation enabled Ayatollah
Khomeini to mobilize enormous popular enthusiasm about the retaliatory
seizure of the American Embassy and the holding hostage of those of
more than 80 Americans associated with the diplomatic facility. Such a
development became an ordeal for those held hostage and for the United
States generally. It revealed the anti-American fury that lay at the base
of the Iranian revolutionary process. These events unfolded in reaction to
the American grant of asylum, but they might have occurred in any event.
The Fernando Marcos case is quite different in many respects. True,
he was our man in Manila, yet his ascent to power was perceived to be
based on his own capabilities, including a ruthless attitude toward adversaries. Furthermore, the United States distanced itself from some of his
abuses of state power and opposed his retention of power at the end in
the face of a manifestly fraudulent election, mass civil disobedience, and
large-scale mutiny in the armed forces. The United States was less implicated, and also had given to the Philippines a kind of political independence after World War II. What is more, by removing Marcos to this
country at the time of deepening crisis, the United States enabled the
transition to Aquino leadership without bloodshed, a major contribution
to the new order in the Philippines dedicated to social justice and political democracy. What is more, the U.S. Government seems to be cooperating in the early efforts to impose accountability on the Marcos family for
its vast economic plunder during its period of autocratic rule. This cooperation has taken various forms, including giving over evidence, freezing
assets, and allowing the new leadership to pursue their claims in our
courts. Of course, separation of powers here means that the courts are
substantially free to determine their own rules of procedures, and those
pose large obstacles. There is a need for both an international convention
and domestic legislation that mandates assistance from banks and other
fiduciary entities to public claimants of assets expropriated during prior
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periods of dictatorial rule. In the early period of Marcos residency, U.S.
officials tried to arrange a less inflammatory place of asylum, exploring
without success, the willingness of Panama, Spain, and others to give secure asylum. In the light of the experience after the Shah's admission the
United States naturally associated political risks with granting asylum to
a former friendly dictator deposed by angry, populist action. Developments in the Philippines, as well as in Haiti, and even Argentina, suggest
that the anti-American backlash in Iran that followed upon the admission
of the Shah (and was invoked to justify the seizure of the U.S. Embassy
and hold hostage its residents for more than a year) was a special case
rather than a general pattern.
That, then, is the proper approach for the United States to adopt
toward the grant of "asylum" to deposed dictator? What is the best overall approach for the world community? It is a complicated matter: it is
desirable to have beleaguered dictators leave rather than stay behind and
fight in the belief that they have no alternative. Jacopo Timmerman during the last years of Argentinean military rule told me that "the ghosts of
Nuremberg" kept the generals in place long after they lost the will to
govern. It is difficult to assess the impact of the Argentinean trials of former officials on the Chilean dictatorships. It might provide Chile with
relief from repressive rule if Pinochet could be offered attractive asylum
somewhere. But where? Do we want to make this country a center for
extremist exile movements and politics? Experience with Batista exiles
from Cuba and Somoza exiles suggests the destabilizing impacts on the
host country. Johnny Carson, although not normally acknowledged as a
noted political analyst, had a practical proposal - establishing an international island haven called Fled where deposed dictators could live out
their years in slumber, being punished by the disagreeable company of
their former colleagues. My own view is that we need a flexible approach
that balance the importance of personal accountability for crimes of state
against the desirability of promoting peaceful and rapid transitions to democracy. In effect, a case-by-case approach based on Executive discretion.
From the viewpoint of potential asylum-granting country that priority be given to peaceful transition, as was done in the instance of Marcos,
but once the transition has occurred, or it is evident that it will not be
democratic in any event, then it is important not to poison relations with
a successor government by protecting a former tyrant from efforts to inflict punishment for crimes of state. Here, too, the issues are confused,
and no rigid set of guidelines will suffice. A country should neither want
to insulate a former ruler from inquiry and even prosecution for former
wrongs, nor to deliver such a person to a legal process that offers no reasonable prospect of due process. Such a dilemma is made more acute if
the former ruler acted in a repressive and dishonest manner, and yet was
a close ally. This situation is made even more serious if the asylum country has been perceived by the new leadership as having practiced interventionary diplomacy that led to the installation of the displaced leadership in past years. All these elements were present in the aftermath of
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the Shah's fall from power, as well as efforts by special banking interests
and by such influential figures as Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller
to push for the Shah's admission, partly to provoke the crisis that ensued.
Only by a crisis between post-Shah Iran and the United States did those
with heavy credits gain the leverage needed to collect their debts. Perhaps, it would be helpful to draw a general distinction between provocative asylum to be avoided and constructive asylum to be granted, although in a specific instance a delicate judgment may be required.
In general, while accountability is important, the possible adverse
consequences of refusing asylum in some instances seem paramount.
Hence, the prospects of accountability should be subordinated at this
stage of international relations whenever a grant of asylum contributes to
a peaceful transition. It remains an option to impose responsibility symbolically by a legal process held in the country where the individual committed crimes of state. Furthermore, it should be a strict policy that the
asylum state limit the activities of a deposed leader and his entourage
(i.e. avoid provocative asylum) by forbidding the practice of exile politics.
The asylum state could also extend friendship and aid to a new leadership that seemed committed to democratic governance and the restoration of human rights.
There are some additional issues. It is important to refrain from intervention in foreign societies on behalf of dictatorial political forces. The
relation of the CIA to such rulers as the Shah and Pinochet creates resentment and suspicions on the part of democratic forces. If the United
States renounced such covert operations on behalf of dictatorial rule the
whole issue would largely disappear. Finally, there is a problem connected
with counter-democratic movements that bring reverse considerations
into play. Suppose that Ms. Aquino is deposed by military forces and is
placed in a position of seeking asylum. In such a political setting, the
grant of asylum would be appropriate even if it had some adverse repercussions on bilateral relations. Further, the considerations that militate
against exile politics in the instance of a deposed dictator work in reverse
if the deposed leader has been committed to democratic practices and
human rights. Such "discrimination" is not meant to endorse pro-democratic intervention as a matter of foreign policy.
IV.

SANCTUARY,

CONSCIENCE,

AND LAW

It might seem as if dealing with the vulnerability of the weak should
be simple ... or is it? In a world of mass poverty, ethnic persecution, and
ideological strife, grounds of persecution are numerous and severe. The
humanitarian case for easy admission of the persecuted seems strong, but
so are the problems. The U.S. already feels its integrity and prosperity
threatened by a flood of immigrants, many of whom are illegal. Furthermore, by granting asylum from persecution or conferring refugee status
we pass a kind of judgment on the foreign government that may undermine foreign policy efforts to support that government. As might be expected during the period of Cold War, refugee laws have been loosely ap-
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plied in relation to those who flee Communist rule because we seek to
emphasize and manifest disapproval, and are rigidly applied in relation to
anti-Communist regimes because we have not wanted to erode their
claims of legitimacy, or to lessen grounds for support.
The issue of Sanctuary Movement represents an extremely determined attempt to wrest the initiative away from the State on these issues
of rights of entry in a context of unusual harshness. The main context
arises from official policies that have led to the return of refugees by deportation to Guatemala and El Salvador in circumstances where they face
hardships and severe punishments and abuses. In effect, citizens relying
on religious tradition challenge the monopoly of legal authority over issues of admission and exclusion. Ever since Antigone defied the Theban
ruler Creon by burying her brother slain in battle has the issue of individual conscience and tradition versus state authority been posed in Western
civilization. This issue is posed by civil disobedience and conscientious
objection to unjust laws, as well as by performance of so-called "Nuremberg Actions."
Religious institutions have a particular role in acting as guardians of
conscience and sacred tradition. The state, especially beneath the banner
of national security, has come to exert unconditional claims over the obedience of its citizenry. More than ever before, even in democratic countries, we need the ethical safety valve provided by upholding the prerogative of churches to offer sanctuary to aliens threatened with dangerous
and harsh deportation. In a sense, I am arguing for the other side of the
separation of church and state, that the state respect a domain of conscience defined by the assertion of judgment by duly constituted religious
bodies.
Of course, here too the general principle needs to be qualified by various special circumstances of application. It is not unimaginable that
some churches would extend "sanctuary" to fascist and other anti-democratic elements, or to those seeking to avoid legitimate prosecution for
crimes in their country of origin. The limits of sanctuary seems like an
appropriate question for judicial assessment, but only within a context
that acknowledges legitimate scope for grants of sanctuary based on the
reasonable belief that the individuals involved face risks of persecution or
severe hardship is forced to return to their country of origin.
There is, of course, room for extravagant claims, but all human arrangements are subject to abuse. These alleged concerns at this stage are
mainly disguised forms of opposition to any derogation from the concentration to authority in the state. It is fair to inquire why should governments lose some of their authority over immigration policy. The broader
constitutional issues here are several: establishing effective mechanisms
for protecting human rights; restoring popular sovereignty and the role of
the citizenry; de-centering political and legal authority. In the background is a search for greater internal balance between state and civil
society, a search that reacts to the steady accretion of power at the governmental center of state power that has occurred over the decades. Sanc-
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tuary is a creative embodiment of our earliest constitutional vision of
"checks and balances" and it offers our society a way to moderate the
exercise of power by government through the privileged inter-position of
conscience validated by formal action of religious communities, as well as
through taking account of spiritual considerations in the formulation of
public policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this lecture has been a simple plea: to establish constitutional governance, given the expansion of state power and the uneven
pattern of its application in context of entry and exclusion by those of
foreign origin, we require considerable legal innovation, especially if, in
the spirit of Myres McDougal, we regard the overarching mission of law
to be the promotion of values associated with human dignity. Translating
this generalized sentiment into practice at the doctrinal level suggests
several policy conclusions. We need to strengthen procedures for personal
accountability arising from alleged crimes of state by foreign leaders
through national and international action. Additionally, we require a flexible doctrine of asylum that is sensitive to humanitarian issues, to the
diplomatic conditions for positive international relations, and to the
grievances of foreign societies against leaders who have been guilty of
gross abuses of power. And finally, we need to give constitutional protection to principled practices associated with the provision of sanctuary to
individuals threatened with deportation in circumstances where genuine
risks of persecution and hardship exist. These complementary norms are
designed to accommodate complex and contradictory issues bearing on
whether entry or exclusion is the appropriate stance.
In dealing with the special, somewhat unusual, problems of deposed
dictators exceedingly sensitive issues can be involved, especially here in
the United States where the dictatorial regime has often been treated as a
friend during its period of political tenure. One suggestion made here is
to draw a distinction based on circumstances and probable effects between constructive and provocative asylum, and if a controversial former
dictator or autocratic ruler is admitted, then his activities should be constrained to avoid provoking a successor government, especially if it frustrated in its efforts to apprehend a former ruler for prosecution. Even
provocative asylum may be justified if the practices of the new government represents a deterioration of respect for human rights and democracy. However, such interpretations will be lacking incredibility if
manipulated to reflect the geopolitical alignments of the Cold War.
As part of a process of domestic readjustment, it is necessary to reconsider United States policies and practices that encourage the emergence of dictatorial rule in foreign countries. To the extent this encouragement has become known, it has aroused strong anti-American
resentment. In this regard, covert operations in particular and interventionary diplomacy in general have damaged the reputation of the United
States as a friend of democracy and a promoter of human rights. It is a
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matter of reassessing national interests so that the United States will not
be regarded as the natural adversary of nationalist movements in the
Third World.
Although it is difficult to document, there seems to be a connection
between structures of oppression and recourse to desperate strategies of
violent resistance, including various forms of terrorist practice. If we seek
to break the connection we must as a political actor take human suffering
seriously, both at home and abroad. Such a moral perspective underlies
what I have had to say on these diverse issues of asylum for deposed
dictators and protected entry for endangered aliens.
The law needs, in my judgment, to be guided by this understanding
of the moral foundations of political order. It is time to associate the
grant of asylum, the option of sanctuary with questions of suffering and
the reduction of violence rather than with the abstract, and often misleading, calculations of geopolitics and ideological rivalry. Of course, there
are gray areas where judgment is required and errors can occur, as when
it becomes necessary to balance the claim of a deposed dictator for asylum and that of an aggrieved people for personal accountability, or to
assess whether granting asylum is necessary to induce abdication and the
avoidance of civil strife.
In the end, all those with the power of legal decision are encouraged
to wrestle with the normative challenge of promoting the values of human
dignity in a realistic and effective manner, but with a bias toward decentralist and grassroots solutions (sanctuary) and a skepticism about statist
claims to dispose of issues of moral and political choice.

